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The Challenges of EU Enforcement and
Elements of Criminal Law Theory: On
Sanctions and Value in Contemporary
‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ Law
E. Herlin-Karnell *
Abstract: This paper challenges established visions of EU legal enforcement by
testing them in the context of criminal law theory and asks to what extent EU
law can be enforced against non-compliant Member States via the use of criminal
law. A main theme running through this article is the basic question of the extent to
which the EU legislator needs criminal law provisions for the enforcement of EU
law. The paper does this by looking at the effect of administrative sanctions and
their link to criminal law sanctions. In addition, the article assesses the wider
theoretical implications for the enforcement of EU law through criminal law and
specifically when the values of the EU and those of the Member States are in
conflict. Critically, the paper asks if the EU enforcement toolkit is sufficiently
nuanced when applied in a criminal law context and sets out to chart the genesis
of EU law enforcement through the use of criminal law theory. This seems par-
ticularly relevant to the discussion of enforcement in general, given that the oper-
ation of EU law essentially and chiefly concerns the values to be enforced in the
national arena.
I. Introduction
If any law enforcer were to need a tool, surely it would be criminal law, which is
generally considered the ultimate threat of the law. Criminal law is distinctive
because of its moral voice; it is a coercive system directed at controlling the
behaviour of citizens.1 But is the EU a moral project, ready to take on
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condemning powers amounting to coercion? The story of EU criminal law and
its development has been one of the most controversial in the history of EU legal
enforcement. In particular it has cast some light on the thin dividing line be-
tween enforcement issues and legislative competence questions proper.2 Yet
while the EU has for a long time had the power to require Member States to
provide effective means for ensuring the enforcement of EU law, even if those
meant the imposition of criminal law, enforcing EU law through criminalization
at the EU level has always been a different question, given that the EU lacked a
legislative competence prior to the Lisbon Treaty.3
With that background, and given the increased EU sanction powers, a core
issue arising in the context of enforcement is the extent to which EU values can
be imposed against Member States that no longer comply with the fundamental
values of the EU as expressed in the Treaty. As these values play an inherent role
in the EU’s genetic makeup, it would seem ludicrous if core founding values
embraced by the EU and subscribed to by the Member States when signing the
Treaty were not upheld in practice.4 Article 2 of the Treaty of the European
Union (TEU) stipulates that the Union is founded on the values of respect for
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. Yet while
the EU has high hurdles for candidate states for membership, the stakes seem a
lot lower once a state has become a member of the club. The enforcement threat
emanating from the EU Commission in the form of infringement proceedings,
or from the Court of Justice in the form of a judgment indicating disapproval of
an individual Member State’s behaviour, is not sufficient to change innate
behaviour.5 Therefore, an important question, albeit largely understudied, is
to what extent the EU can use criminal law as a mechanism of enforcement
in order successfully to transplant—and maintain—its values in the national
arena. The present paper takes this as its starting point and sets out to embark
on a broader study as regards the relationship between EU enforcement rules
and criminal law theory and how the two could be reconciled in the absence of a
clear justification on the part of the EU regarding the use of sanctions.
2 See S Weatherill, ‘Competence and legitimacy’ in C Barnard and O Odudu (eds), The Outer
Limits of EU Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 5.
3 On the basics of EU criminal law see eg (in English) M Dougan, ‘From the velvet glove to the
iron fist: Criminal sanctions for the enforcement of Union law’, in M Cremona (ed.), Compliance
and Enforcement of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 74; S Summers et al., The
Emergence of EU Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014); V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009); M Fletcher et al., EU Criminal Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
2008), S Mettinen, EU Criminal Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); E Herlin-Karnell, The
Constitutional Dimension of EU Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012); A Klip, EU
Criminal Law (Munich: Beck, 2009).
4 See also the recent editorial (2015) ‘Safeguarding EU Values in the Member States—is some-
thing finally happening?’ (2015) 52 CML Rev 619.
5 On the basics of enforcement, see, eg D Chalmers et al., EU Law (3rd edn, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), ch 5.
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More specifically, the paper discusses the wider theoretical implications for the
enforcement of EU law through criminal law when the values as expressed in
Article 2 TEU and those of the Member States are in conflict or when current
EU law norms are not respected and/or maintained in the national arena. And,
more critically, is the EU enforcement toolkit sufficiently nuanced when applied
in a criminal law context? This paper consequently charts the genesis of EU law
enforcement through the use of criminal law by placing it in the framework of
the enforcement of values in EU law and thereby debating which kind of values
criminal law is capable of communicating. This seems particularly relevant to
the discussion of enforcement in general, given that the operation of EU law
essentially and chiefly concerns the values to be enforced in the national arena.
This article aims to demonstrate that, with regard to the enforcement of EU law
through the use of criminal law, the enforcement system presupposes that the
legal safeguards in place are sufficiently robust to ensure that the EU itself
complies with the Charter standards, as well as the Treaty-based promise of
constructing an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The paper
seeks to demonstrate that the EU’s choice of sanctions in its enforcement strat-
egy matters at a number of interrelated levels. First the longstanding reliance on
administrative sanctions as part of the market-making package in the EU con-
tinues to ask difficult questions as to the application of procedural safeguards
that are associated with a criminal law sanction in accordance with the
Convention on Human Rights case law.6 Secondly, while stressing and exem-
plifying the complicated grid of sanctions in the EU context and the challenges
it causes for enforcement, the paper also discusses the peculiarities of enforce-
ment when entering the domain of criminal law theory by briefly outlining the
core principles of legality and proportionality. The paper concludes by specif-
ically looking at the enforcement of legal safeguards in EU criminal law. The
discussion shows that the question of enforcement has still largely failed to be
addressed at the EU level.
II. EU criminal law project and enforcement endeavours: the basic
framework for understanding the development of the sanctions
regime
While the issue of enforcement in the EU context concerns how EU law is
received in the national arena and thereby makes EU law a living concept in the
6 Eg E Herlin-Karnell, ‘Is Administrative Law Still Relevant? How the battle of sanctions has
shaped EU criminal law’, NYU: Jean Monnet Working Paper 25/14 (2014); J Frese, Sanctions in EU
Competition Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014).
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Member States,7 the question of enforcement in a criminal law context is pre-
dominantly about placing procedural limits on the way in which state autho-
rities use the criminal law system to implement their policies.8 These strategies
should essentially ensure that the state’s enforcement mechanisms are consistent
with due process rights.
At present the EU relies on a complex regime combining criminal law and
administrative sanctions to enforce its norms and values. This regime has a
unilateral goal of enforcing EU law to the greatest extent possible, but without
any clear criminal law theory in mind. Yet this seems unwise as much of what
criminal law is concerned with is controlling levels of risk-taking, and what kind
of behaviour is considered acceptable from a moral and societal perspective.9
The purpose and aim of enforcement through the use of criminal law at the
EU level have to be placed in context. In the early days of the EU project, the
EU legislator relied on administrative sanctions for enforcing EU law.10
However, the fairly recent environmental crimes case of September 2005
opened up a ‘Pandora’s box’ of opportunities for the EU legislator to enact
criminal law by stipulating a legislative competence in situations in which this is
needed to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law.11 This ruling shifted a criminal
law competence from the Member States to the EU by stating that criminal law
could be a matter for the EU legislator if the principle of effectiveness required
it. The ruling was considered groundbreaking since there was no legislative
criminal law competence in the EU at the time the judgment was delivered,
even though the failed Constitutional Treaty would have conferred such a com-
petence in 2005. The judgment was also heavily criticized for placing too much
trust in the magic of effectiveness as a criteria for EU criminalization.12
With the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, AFSJ matters, including criminal law, were
‘supra-nationalized’, that is, moved from the former third pillar to that of
mainstream EU law. Lisbon listed a set of EU crimes considered to have
cross-border dimensions, such as the fight against terrorism and money laun-
dering, in Article 83 TFEU.
Perhaps the most important axiom for the development of EU criminal law
enforcement (and sanctions more broadly), however, has been the EU principle
of loyalty (Article 4(3) TEU)13 as it required the Member States to ensure
7 Eg S Andersen, The Enforcement of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and
M Cremona (ed.), Compliance and Enforcement of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
8 For an overview, see eg P Whelan, The Criminalization of European Cartels Enforcement (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014); A Ashworth and M Reymar, The Criminal Law Process (4th edn,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 20–58.
9 See, for example, V Tadros, ‘Controlling risk’, in A Ashworth et al. (eds), Prevention and the
Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 133.
10 Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 1–2965.
11 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879.
12 Herlin-Karnell (n 3).
13 See eg Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 1–2965; M Dougan, National Remedies
before the Court of Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); T Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law
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compliance with EU law even when that included use of criminal law sanctions.
It could thus be said that the principle of loyalty identified a constitutional
dynamic, which indirectly ensures what the former EC Treaty lacked before
the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty. While the obligation of loyalty has
always played a crucial role in shaping the contours of EU law enforcement, it is
interlinked with the principle of effectiveness in EU law which has constrained
Member States’ autonomy in order not to act against the spirit of the effective-
ness of EU law.14 In this way, it seems like the EU would often appear to be
pursuing a goal of effective legislation at the expense of national values.15 While
the debate on EU enforcement is well established, this paper aims to broaden
the debate and thereby to explore the issue of enforcement in the context of
criminal law theory as such.16
A key underlying theoretical issue is the extent to which we need EU criminal
law other than in an obvious cross-border scenario, such as the fight against
organized crime. This question is actually of great theoretical importance and
not merely rhetorical. A criminal lawyer would probably argue that only the
state is entitled to administer criminal justice.17 There are generally, two schools
of thought when deciding which acts should be criminalized. An objectivist
would argue, for example, that it is the outcome that matters and that the
communicative function of law is its ability to signal to society what ought to
be punished.18 A subjectivist, on the other hand, would focus on the moral
element of a crime as the guiding dictum for apportioning blameworthiness.19
Accordingly, expressed in simplified terms, criminal law is chiefly concerned
with the question of ‘just deserts’; that is, whether the person deserves to be
labelled as a criminal and, if so, what level of offence is justifiably applicable. So
what justifies action by the EU here? This question has long been evaded in the
EU context, largely because there was no political need to address the issue
because, prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had no
legislative competence to enact criminal law provisions. Instead, the EU created
its own quasi-penal system of sanctions, still existing today, which is examined in
more detail in the next subsection.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); T Konstadinides, Division of Powers in the European Union
(Deventer: Kluwer Law Publishing, 2009).
14 See, eg P Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 257.
15 See eg Case C-399/11 Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni. See also A Albi, ‘Erosion of
Constitutional Rights in EU Law: A Call for “Substantive Co-operative Constitutionalism”’, (2015)
9 Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law 151.
16 See eg Herlin-Karnell (n 3), ch2.
17 A Ashworth, ‘Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice’ (2002) 42 British Journal of
Criminology 578; also discussed in M Thorburn, ‘Proportionate Sentencing and the Rule of Law’
in L Zedner and J Roberts (eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in
Honour of Andrew Ashworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 269.
18 A Ashworth, ‘Taking the Consequences’, in S Shute et al. (eds) Action and Value in Criminal Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 110.
19 Ibid.
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A. Enforcement through non-criminal sanctions in the
contemporary EU
In order to better understand the rationale of enforcement of EU law through
the use of criminal law, it is necessary to further clarify the delicate debate
regarding the characterization of the sanctions used.
The discussion on sanctions in EU law setting has tended to focus on the
controversial EU administrative sanctions system and on the question of
whether these sanctions, contrary to their ‘administrative’ label, should properly
be viewed as falling under the umbrella of criminal law. Such an interpretation
would, in accordance with the criteria laid down by the European Court of
Human Rights in the case law on Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), ensure the right to a fair trial and a subjective fault
element.20 Administrative sanctions have always formed a crucial part of the
EU’s enforcement strategy, particularly with regard to competition fines and
sanctions in the domain of EU agriculture and fisheries policies.21 Yet with the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and thereby the legislative competences
granted in criminal matters, one would perhaps have thought that there was no
further need for administrative law sanctions in the EU where there are already
criminal law sanctions in place. The distinction between administrative law and
criminal law used to be the main point of departure for the debate on sanctions
back in the days when the EU pillars division still determined the realm of
competence of the EU’s involvement in criminal law proper. In those early days,
a lack of legislative competence in criminal law (the former EC pillar) meant
that the administrative procedure was the only avenue by which the EU could
impose sanctions. However, despite the Treaty reformation and thereby the
inclusion of criminal law in the Treaty (as part of the area of freedom, security,
and justice), as this paper will show, the EU legislator still favours the admin-
istrative procedure in certain market related areas. With the Lisbon Treaty in
place, the framework has naturally changed as, alongside the EU’s general en-
forcement armory, Articles 82 and 83 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) specifically grant the EU a competence in criminal
law matters with a cross-border dimension.
Yet one of the most clear-cut examples in the contemporary acquis of EU law
of where sanctions are still being invoked despite not being considered as be-
longing to criminal law is where sanctions are being used in the fight against
terrorism. The area of restrictive measures (or administrative sanctions) clearly
has a significant internal–external dimension to it and haas been subject to
debate on the protection of fundamental rights and the scope of the Court’s
20 Eg, Engel and others v Netherlands Series A, No 22 [1979–1980].
21 Eg J Frese, Sanctions in EU Competition Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014).
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jurisdiction in the well-known Kadi saga.22 While in Kadi the Court of Justice
famously extended the jurisdiction of the EU to review, indirectly, UN measures
and while that was a ground-breaking development in the context of sanctions,
the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty means that the previous jurisdictional short-
comings have been resolved thanks to a specific legal basis in the Treaty.
Accordingly, Article 75 TFEU provides for the competence to adopt restrictive
measures in the fight against terrorism. A further question then arises about
which cases concerning the fight against terrorism are to be considered as falling
within the scope of Article 75 TFEU, as opposed to Article 83 TFEU (which
includes criminal law in its list), and the criminal law grid, and whether these
articles are intended to complement each other. It seems as if the dividing line
here is between administrative sanctions (freezing of funds) and criminal law,
with the former being part of Article 75 TFEU and the latter forming part of
Article 83 TFEU.23 This confirms a rather broadly defined competence for the
adoption of sanctions under Article 75 TFEU.
There is an additional layer of complexity regarding the enforcement of
sanctions in this scenario. Specifically, there is difficulty distinguishing between
the internal and external effects of EU action in terms of sanctions in the fight
against terrorism which is reflected in the recent judgment in European
Parliament v Council.24 In this ruling the European Parliament challenged
Council Regulation 1286/2009 amending Council Regulation 881/2002
imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against targeted persons
and entities associated with the Al-Qaeda network.25 The Parliament argued
that, having regard to the aim and content of the Regulation, the correct legal
basis should have been Article 75 TFEU and not Article 215 TFEU. Article 75
TFEU would guarantee a larger role in the legislative process for the Parliament
and would also ensure the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. It confirms a very
scattered role for sanctions, which are located not only within the AFSJ, but also
within external relations competences. With regard to the contested regulation,
the Court of Justice made it clear that this was based on a Security Council
measure and intended to preserve international peace and security, implying that
the measure at stake clearly had the characteristics of a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP). In addition, the Court stated that the argument that it is
22 Court of First Instance (CFI), Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European
Union and Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-3649; European Court of Justice
(CEJ), Case C-402/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the
European Communities [2008] ECR I-5351; General Court, Case T-85/09, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v
European Commission, judgment of 30 September 2010; Kadi II, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/
10 P, and C-595/10 P, judgment of 18 July 2013 (not yet reported).
23 See T Gazzini and E Herlin-Karnell, ‘Restrictive measures adopted by the EU against individuals
from the standpoint of International and European Law’ (2011) 36 European Law Review 798.
24 Case C-130/10, European Parliament v Council, Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 31 January
2012.
25 Case C-130/10, European Parliament v Council, judgment of 19 July 2012 (not yet reported).
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impossible to distinguish between the combating of ‘internal’ terrorism, on the
one hand, and the combating of ‘external’ terrorism, on the other, did not
matter for the choice of legal basis and for the scope of Article 215(2) TFEU
as the legal basis of the contested regulation. The Court therefore stressed the
political considerations behind the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty and accepted
that, when choosing between legal bases, it is not just the role of the European
Parliament and the increased democratic input that are the decisive factors.26
The Court did not specify what those critical factors entailed, but it seems
reasonable to conclude that the choice of sanctions, and thereby also the legal
basis, mattered at the political level as much as the effectiveness of the actual
enforcement or the definition of a sanction. While the European Parliament v
Council is a case which mainly concerns the dividing line between the internal
and the external fight against terrorism, it is also a case which highlights the
choice by the legislator to fight terrorism by means of the administrative model
and not the criminal law model. Therefore, this case is relevant for understand-
ing the current practice of criminal law sanctions in the EU.
The area of administrative or restrictive measures in the fight against terrorism
is not, however, the only area that borders on criminal law and that raises
questions as to the exact definition of a sanction. The battles against money
laundering and the financing of terrorism, for example, which are listed as
crimes in Article 83 TFEU, are still on the agenda in connection with Article
114 TFEU, the internal market provision, as they were before the Lisbon Treaty
entered into force. This confirms an interesting hybrid dimension to AFSJ law
as relevant not only to external relations law (as in the anti-terrorist laws), but
also to hard-core internal market law. This is another area in which the EU’s
security strategy is widely felt to be the reason why the EU is adopting these
measures.
B. EU anti-money laundering action and administrative sanctions
The Money Laundering Directives offer a further interesting example of
the imposition of administrative sanctions and thus follows the international
trend in the fight against dirty money and the financing of terrorism.27
It should be remembered that the first EU Directive on anti-money laun-
dering was adopted in 1991.28 This Directive was subsequently amended in
26 Case C-300/89 Commission v Council [1991] ECR I-2867.
27 See most recent proposal for a Fourth Money Laundering Directive, COM/2013/045 final, on
the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist
financing. See generally on money laundering eg N Ryder, Money Laundering—An Endless Cycle? A
comparative analysis of the anti-money laundering policies in the United States of America, the United
Kingdom, Australia and Canada (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).
28 Directive 91/308/EEC OJ 1991 L 166/77.
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200129 and then replaced by a third Directive in 2005,30 while the Commission
has now introduced a fourth Directive.31 The fourth Directive illustrates an
impressive and ambitious attempt by the Commission to address many of the
challenges neglected in the previous Directives (for example the definition of a
predicate offence).32 The fourth Directive claims to follow the international
trend by including a specific reference to tax crimes within the serious crimes
that can be considered as predicate offences to money laundering. This marks a
new development compared to the third Directive and is problematic as it in-
volves administrative sanctions in a criminal law context, such as the new offence
of tax fraud, in this fourth Directive. The Directive states that it is important to
highlight clearly that ‘tax crimes’ relating to direct and indirect taxes are included
in the broad definition of ‘criminal activity’ in this Directive, in line with the
revised FATF Recommendations.33 While no harmonization of the definitions of
tax crimes in Member States’ national law is sought, Member States should allow,
to the greatest extent possible under their national law, the exchange of informa-
tion or the provision of assistance between EU Financial Intelligence Units. So
while not directly requiring a tax crime competence at the EU level, it does so
indirectly by allocating enforcement powers to the EU.34
In addition, the fourth Directive imposes an extended duty of risk assessment
on the Member States, and raises the awkward question of whether the Member
States are actually fit for this task and how the regime should be enforced. One
of the arguments put forward in the fourth Money Laundering Directive is the
classic claim that the EU is required to act because national action alone is not
enough. The fourth Directive states that money laundering and terrorist finan-
cing are international problems and that efforts to combat them should be
global. Intriguingly, the Directive also covers those illegal activities if they are
committed on the internet.35 But the relationship between the money launder-
ing framework and the cyber crime Directive in this regard is remarkably
unclear.36
29 Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 91/
308/EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering
OJ L344, 28 December 2004.
30 Directive 2005/60/EC OJ L309, 25 November 2005.
31 Fourth Money Laundering Directive, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing, Directive (EU) 2015/849.
32 Money laundering is by definition based on another crime termed a predicate offence, which
gives rise to the laundering in question.
33 Given that different tax offences may be designated in each Member State as constituting
‘criminal activity’ punishable by means of the sanctions as referred to in point (4)(f ) of Article 3
of this Directive, national law definitions of tax crimes may diverge.
34 Article 57 states ‘Differences between national law definitions of tax crimes shall not impede the
ability of FIUs to exchange information or provide assistance to another FIU, to the greatest extent
possible under their national law.’
35 On the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and
terrorist financing, COM (2013) 45/3.
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In tandem with the Directive, the EU has also adopted a Regulation, based on
Article 114 TFEU, regulating the transfer of funds.37 This is linked to the EU’s
internal security strategy and focuses on ensuring a payer’s information is made
immediately available to law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities.
Curiously, while largely overlapping with the Directive, the Regulation points
out that it may not always be possible in criminal investigations to identify the
relevant data or the person concerned until long after the original transfer took
place. Consequently a preventive approach should be adopted and information
stored to facilitate investigation. The Regulations affirm that information on the
payer and the payee shall not be retained for longer than strictly necessary.
Payment service providers of the payer and of the payee shall retain records
of the information (Articles 4–7 of the Regulation) for a period of five years.
Yet this raises several questions. Is the retention of data for five years propor-
tionate? Would it stand a proportionality test on the necessity of keeping the
data for that long?38 Indeed, it is difficult to see how the proposal complies with
the provisions on data protection.
Finally, the fourth Directive on anti-money laundering adds an extra layer to
the complexity of the EU’s web of sanctions by requiring an evidence-based
approach and by including European agencies such as the European Supervisory
Authorities (ESA) in the anti-money laundering scheme. The proposal contains
several areas where work by the ESA is envisaged as raising crucial issues with
respect to the relationship between this agency and AFSJ agencies such as
Europol and Eurojust. This complex interaction of AFSJ policies and financial
regulation at the heart of the internal market is intensified by the fact that the
European Banking Authority has been asked to carry out an assessment of the
money laundering and terrorism financing risks facing the EU. Yet the greater
emphasis on the risk-based approach requires an enhanced degree of guidance
for Member States and financial institutions on the factors to be taken into
account when applying simplified and enhanced customer due diligence and
when applying a risk-based approach to supervision. In addition, the ESAs have
been tasked with providing regulatory technical standards for certain issues, such
as those requiring financial institutions to adapt their internal controls to deal
with specific situations.
C. Market manipulation/abuse sanctions
The area of market manipulation (or market abuse) represents another sensitive
area in which the boundary of sanctions has become blurred. While it is true
36 Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems.
37 Regulation (EU) 2015/847 on information accompanying transfers of funds.
38 See eg Case C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital rights, judgment of 8 April 2014 (not yet reported)
and Case C-362/14, Schrems, judgment delivered on 6 October 2015 (not yet reported).
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that the new Market Abuse Directive39 is based on Article 83(2) TFEU, which
provides a more extensive competence than the areas listed in Article 83 (1)
TFEU for the effective implementation of a Union policy and so obviously
involves criminal law, it also adds administrative sanctions to the picture.
According to the Commission, market abuse can be carried out across borders
and this divergence undermines the internal market, thus creating scope for
perpetrators of market abuse to carry such abuse into jurisdictions that do
not provide for criminal sanctions for a particular offence. The Directive40 is
seeking to change this by adding criminal law to the discussion in order to fight
market abuse more effectively. For this reason, we now face two instruments:
one Directive and one Regulation that, in the ideal world, would complement
one another.
The proposed Regulation41 regulates the same area as the Directive, but its
regime is stricter. Interestingly, it could be said that the Regulation brings com-
petition law in through the back door by creating far-reaching surveillance
mechanisms and introducing ‘blacklisting’ of companies, but without ensuring
the full protection of criminal law procedure. The Regulation requires the
publication of sanctions and allows competent authorities far-reaching powers
similar to those of competition law raids and anti-terrorism measures.
Therefore, it could be argued that the Regulation brings us very close to the
area of competition law, by imposing (as outlined in Arts 1215 of the
Regulation) an obligation on issuers of financial instruments to issue so-called
listing of companies or individuals engaged in market abuse. This Regulation is
closely associated with reform of the MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive) and it has been suggested that it should become effective on the date
that the MiFID review enters into application.42 Hence the proposal follows the
Commission Communication on ‘Ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives
markets: Future policy actions’, where the Commission undertook to extend
relevant provisions of the MAD to cover derivatives markets in a comprehensive
fashion.43
As for the legal basis of the Regulation, the Commission states ‘There is a
need to establish a uniform framework in order to preserve market integrity and
to avoid potential regulatory arbitrage as well as to provide more legal certainty
and less regulatory complexity for market participants.’44 Hence, the
39 Directive 2014/57/EU, Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipu-
lation, OJ L 3/179
40 Ibid.
41 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
42 Directive 2004/39/EC, Markets in Financial Instruments, OJ L 145, 21 April 2004.
43 European Commission Communication: Ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets,
COM (2009) 332, 3 July 2009.
44 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
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justification for adopting the Regulation is the same as for the proposed
Directive, albeit with a different legal basis, namely Article 114 TFEU and
the establishment of the internal market. The Regulation aims expressly to
contribute to the smooth functioning of the internal market. Most importantly,
the Regulation establishes a new layer of sanctions: administrative sanctions
regulating the same area as the Directive.45 Why, then, the need for this dual
approach, with both a Directive and a Regulation, to fight market abuse? More
generally, the Regulation appears to confirm a new trend where ‘less is no longer
more’ and where the legislator is putting various back-ups into place. The ex-
planation seems to be a lack of efficiency within the EU system and where the
financial crisis has prompted the EU to act more vigorously, the effect of the
subsidiarity principle is not really considered.
Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn here is that it can be seriously
questioned whether dual regulation through criminal law sanctions and admin-
istrative sanctions, as proposed in various EU Regulations and the proposed
fourth Directive respectively, breaches the principle of ne bis in idem or double
jeopardy and, thereby, Article 50 in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article
50 states that ‘No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal
proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted
or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law.’ Considering the
increasing use of administrative sanctions, it could be argued that such an ap-
proach leads to a fundamentally unfair system and that the proportionality
principle has an important role to play here so as to avoid double procedures.
A recent famous example of tensions between ne bis in idem and national ad-
ministrative sanctions regimes was the case of Åkerberg Fransson concerning
compatibility with the ne bis in idem principle of a national system involving
two separate sets of proceedings to penalize the same wrongful conduct and
where the Court stipulated a general proportionality requirement.46 But this
would require a structured proportionality test, one which inserts a reasonable-
ness check into the proportionality assessment. With Barak, ‘tests of causation
and severity regarding the blow to the public interest should be balanced against
tests of the limitation of the various human rights at issue’.47 Surely this must
apply to the EU regime on sanctions, that is, where the principle of propor-
tionality could serve as a tool for injecting quality into the legislative regime?
Similarly, it questions whether double systems of sanctions are strictly necessary
in the area of financial crimes.
Moreover, as mentioned, the market abuse regime for ‘blacklisting’, through
the publication of sanctions and the granting to competent authorities of far-
45 See E Herlin-Karnell, ‘White-collar crime and European financial crises: Getting tough on EU
market abuse’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 487.
46 C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, judgment of 26 February 2013 (not yet reported).
47 A Barak, ‘Proportional effect: The Israeli experience’, (2007) University of Toronto Law Journal,
369.
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reaching powers similar to those in competition law raids and anti-terrorism
measures, raises some difficult questions. These questions include more general
issues relating to the right to a fair trial in EU law and are closely intertwined
with the long-standing debate on competition fines.48
D. Agencies and administrative sanctions: accountability deficit
The importance of agencies in EU law making in general is far from new. They
are often said to represent a step in the direction of ‘better regulation’.49 The
exact positioning of these agencies in the legislative context and their place in the
AFSJ machinery are, however, unclear. Areas such as medical authorization,
electricity regulation, and heath regulation have all been reformed in recent
years and offer examples of hybrid governance in terms of combining traditional
EU legal instruments with network models relying on agencies and new forms
of governance such as comitology and the open method of coordination. This is
all new, however, in the AFSJ. While this paper does not delve into this complex
debate, the technocratic approaches clearly pose difficulties from a democratic
perspective, given that many issues, including medical regulation, touch upon
ethical points that require democratic legitimation and accountability.50
Nevertheless, the prospect of adopting a technocratic model for the AFSJ
with regard to criminal law should raise concern. For example, the fourth
Money Laundering Directive, discussed above, contains several areas where
work by the European Supervisory Authorities is envisaged to raise crucial
issues with respect to the relationship between this agency and AFSJ agencies
such as Europol and Eurojust. The complex interaction of AFSJ policies and
financial regulation at the heart of the internal market is intensified by the fact
that the European Banking Authority has been asked to carry out an assessment
of the money laundering and terrorism financing risks facing the EU. However,
a greater emphasis on a risk-based approach requires an enhanced degree of
guidance for Member States and financial institutions on the factors to be taken
into account when applying simplified and enhanced customer due diligence
and when applying a risk-based approach to supervision. In addition, the ESAs
have been tasked with providing regulatory technical standards for certain issues,
such as those requiring financial institutions to adapt their internal controls to
deal with specific situations. It is technocratic in the sense that the framework
for fighting financial crimes is regulated in a way that is similar to that of
medical issues and risk regulation in environmental law.
48 Frese (n 21); Herlin-Karnell (n 45), 487.
49 See F Vibert, ‘Better regulation and the role of agencies’ in S Weatherill (ed.), Better Regulation
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) ch 20.
50 J Neyer, The Justification of Europe: A Political Theory of Supranational Integration (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012) 25–7.
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Moreover, while the AFSJ agencies of Europol and Eurojust do not have
direct regulatory enforcement powers, they are increasingly important players
in the AFSJ regulatory machinery. However, the Member States themselves have
retained law enforcement powers and have not delegated such powers to the
AFSJ agencies, with the exception of Frontex in the area of migration law
policies.51 Yet Europol has been given extended powers to supervise the EU
crime-fighting agenda within the AFSJ, and this has resulted in a complex
relationship between AFSJ legislation and the role played by Europol in, for
example, the financial tracking programme and the proposals, such as the fourth
Money Laundering Directive discussed above, which are part of the internal
market acquis. The European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) is re-
sponsible for supervising relevant instruments adopted within the internal
market. The ESMA Regulation contains a review clause that grants the Court
of Justice the power to review fines imposed by this agency. It is not clear,
however, to what extent Europol and Eurojust can be called to account for
their action.52 Specifically, it appears difficult for an individual to challenge a
decision taken by an Agency and have the question addressed in the EU court,
asserting standing or going through the preliminary procedure system may not
be straightforward.53 The same holds true for the possible establishment of a
European Public Prosecutor with far-reaching powers to investigate financial
crimes and with very little transparency as to how it could be held account-
able.54 There is a clear accountability deficit, therefore, with regard to the role
and function of agencies as key agents in the sanction game. It asks fundamental
questions about the legitimacy of any enforcement of sanctions through
Agencies.
Against the backdrop of the above discussion, the paper will now seek to
emphasize what is truly problematic with the EU’s enforcement strategy and the
lack of a worked out theory as regards the use of sanctions in EU law. After all,
the administrative/criminal law distinction may continue to play a role in the
future development of EU criminal law. But can an individual challenge the
EU’s option to invoke an administrative sanction and thereby claim the right to
a criminal law sanction or thereby challenge the legal basis for the sanction?
Such a claim would not seem overly unrealistic, given that Article 49 the Charter
51 J Monar, ‘Experimentalist governance in justice and home affairs’ in J Zeitlin and CF Sabel (eds),
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) ch 10.
52 On agencies, eg M Busuioc, D Curtin, and M Groenleer, ‘Agency growth between autonomy
and accountability: the European Police Office as a “living institution”’ (2011) 18 Journal of
European Public Policy 848–67. See also P Schammo, ‘The European Union Securities and
Market Authority: Lifting the veil on the allocation of powers’ (2011) 49 CML Rev 1887.
53 On judicial review see e.g. A Arnull, ’Judicial review in the European Union’ in A Arnull & D
Chalmers, The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP, 2015), 376
54 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s
Office, Brussels, 17 Jul. 2013, COM(2013) 534 final 2013/0255 (APP) and G Conway, ‘The
European Public Prosecutor—holding to account a possible European Public Prosecutor’, (2013)
Criminal Law Forum 1.
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sets out a general prohibition against disproportionate criminal law sanctions.
The next section sets out what principles of criminal law theory are of crucial
importance for the enforcement of EU criminal law and sanctions more broadly.
This paper argues that these principles should apply regardless of the character-
ization of the sanction in question. With that background in mind, and given
the complex regulatory layers of sanctions in this area, this paper will shift its
focus from EU sanctions to a discussion of what basic theoretical principles of
criminal law are crucial when debating enforcement in the EU context. More
specifically, why is the enforcement of EU law through the use of criminal law
special compared to enforcement through administrative sanctions? After all, the
criminal law process often involves a cumbersome procedure, albeit—and most
importantly—with a high standard of due process. Hence, the next section
discusses the peculiarities of criminal law in more depth by drawing on insights
from criminal law theory. In doing so, the paper highlights certain key principles
that seem to be forgotten in much of the contemporary evolution of EU crim-
inal law where the EU’s tactic in the AFSJ appears to depart from the classic
internal market-based formula of removing theof obstacles to market creation.55
Therefore, the task of this paper is to explain why this is problematic given the
reach of EU law into the domain of criminal law.
III. Enforcement issues and elements of criminal law theory
While the question of enforcement concerns the spreading of EU values and the
EU synchronization of EU law with national norms, criminal law is rather about
levels of risk-taking and what can rightly be defined as ‘acceptable’ risk-taking
from a moral and societal perspective.56 Hence, the focus on risk-taking means
that criminal law predominantly concerns the relationship between the individ-
ual and the state.57 Therefore, criminal law is a regulatory tool for influencing
behaviour, while its central element is its communicative function.58 It could be
argued that this ‘communicative’ element for addressing the accepted level of
‘risk-taking’, is what distinguishes criminal law from administrative law (which
often involves strict liability) as criminal law imposes a ‘moral’ stigma at the
same time as it provides for a broader spectrum of procedural rights.
When discussing enforcement through the use of criminal law in an EU
context, it is useful briefly to address the question of why we are enforcing at
all. The harm principle has been the natural starting point for any
55 E Herlin-Karnell, ‘Constructing Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice through the
framework of “Regulation”: A cascade of market-based challenges in the EU’s fight against financial
crime’ (2015) German Law Journal 171.
56 See Tadros (n 3), 133.
57 See, eg, Simester von Hirsch (n 1), 4.
58 Ibid. See also A Harel, Why Law Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) ch 2.
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understanding of the construction of criminal law ever since Mill’s famous
‘harm to others’ stipulation, meaning that the state should intervene as little
as possible.59 According to this principle, the only purpose for which power can
rightfully be exercised over another member of a civilized community against his
will is in order to prevent harm to others.60 Feinberg and others developed this
concept by arguing that the harm in question should also be wrongful.61 The
assumption in this respect is that criminalization is aimed at protecting interests
from harm. However, unlike in a classic state-bound discussion on criminal law,
this debate has not driven the EU’s presence in criminal law, which means that
the question of what harm is being prevented by invoking criminal law has never
been specifically on the agenda. Instead, the debate has focused on the merits of
using criminal law as a way of accelerating the enforcement carousel in the
Member States by focusing on the need for effective, proportionate, and dis-
suasive sanctions and ‘taming’ nation states. The harm question was of course
indirectly addressed in a classic judgment of an Environmental crimes case,
where a lot of weight was loaded onto the full effectiveness of the EU when
asserting the EU’s competence to enact criminal law for the protection of the
environment.62 While it is beyond the scope of this article to offer a character-
ization of the harm principle, it is still a question largely connected to the EU’s
need to work out a theory for EU criminal law. The assumption is that crim-
inalization is aimed at protecting interests from harm. And this is what still
needs to be debated at the EU level.
As indicated, the turning point for the EU with regard to the enforcement
debate was the Lisbon Treaty, which granted the EU a new competence to
legislate on cross-border crimes, as well as an extended competence in criminal
matters if this was needed in an area already subject to harmonization. But as
shown above, the EU continues to invoke administrative sanctions when bene-
ficial for the effectiveness of the working of the internal market. This raises
difficulties in a criminal law context, as the national regimes have to adapt to an
EU framework that is not legally mature. What is needed, and largely missing,
in the debate on the enforcement of criminal law is an in-depth analysis of
which criminal law principles should matter in the EU’s endeavours to secure a
strategy for enforcing EU law.
In the following subsections I will set out a number of key principles that are
intrinsic to fundamental values of criminal law and are also of great importance
in EU law. The question of fairness—in broad terms—as guaranteed by the
Charter (Article 47) is a value embedded in the EU’s aspiration of creating a just
59 JS Mill, On Liberty (London, 1859, reprinted Routledge, 1991).
60 For an overview, see Simester von Hirsch (n 1) ch 2.
61 J Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). See also the introductory
chapter ‘The boundaries of the criminal law’ in RA Duff et al. (eds), The Boundaries of the Criminal
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1.
62 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-07879.
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European criminal law space. The broader question of values is also reflected in
the question of ‘fair labelling’, that is, the requirement for criminal law to be
invoked fairly and the acknowledgement that it has an important role to play in
the conception of what criminal justice means from an enforcement perspec-
tive.63 These values are at present not part of the legal safeguards within the
administrative law framework, which is why the administrative law framework is
more efficient but lacks the same high standard of rights as criminal law.
A. Legality and fairness
Legality, in terms of the rule of law, is a constitutional principle of the EU as
recognized in Article 2 EU and is listed as one of the principles that inspired the
EU’s creation. In addition, Article 21 EU makes it clear that not only is the EU
founded on the rule of law but that that foundational value guides the inter-
national action of the Union. Therefore, given the public law nature of the EU
criminal law project, the rule of law is of crucial importance to control coercive
power and ensure respect for human rights. For EU criminal law to work
effectively it has, moreover, to rest on a fair concept of what a common EU
criminal law means for Europe. After all, the concept of fairness generally guides
the philosophy of criminal law.64 Fairness is an essential part of the rule of law as
it generally requires there to be reasonable and foreseeable rules.65 While the
rule of law sets the outer limits of what is acceptable in a democratic society, the
principle of legality is the ABC of any criminal lawyer’s grammar. The principle
of legality is enshrined in Article 7 ECHR and Article 49 of the Charter, both of
which ban retroactive criminal law. Indeed, this principle is the cornerstone
of modern criminal law. It is more complex, however, than a simple prohibition
of retroactive criminal law; instead, the notion of legality is a conjunction of
intertwined principles. Briefly, the principles are that there can be no crime
without written law, there can be no retroactive criminal law, there should be
maximum certainty66 and there can be no crime by analogy. In this way the
principle of legality, as a general principle of EU and criminal law, helps to
control EU institutions and the legislator. There is no doubt that the principle
of legality is of great relevance for the individual at the European level as it can
provide a basis for avoiding criminal liability in the event of unclear regulations
or unimplemented directives. A fifth principle is often added to the above four
axioms of legality. This fifth principle, allowing reliance on a more lenient
63 On labelling, see eg J Chalmers and F Leverick, ‘Fair labelling in criminal law’ (2008) 71 MLR
217 and L Campbell, ‘Criminal labels, the European Convention on Human Rights and the pre-
sumption of innocence’ (2013) 76 MLR 681.
64 J Rawls Justice as Fairness a Restatement (Harvard edition, 2001).
65 Ashworth (n 18), 110.
66 See, eg, Kokkinakis v Greece, ECHR, Series A, No 260-A, 1993; Cantoni v France, ECHR,
Reports 1996-V; Joined Cases C-74/95 and 129/95, Criminal proceedings against X [1996] ECR I-
6609 and Case C-354/95 National Farmers’ Union [1997] ECR I-4559.
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provision at the time of sentencing, is commonly found in many European legal
traditions and, as noted above, is also affirmed in Article 49 of the Charter.67
Nevertheless, such use of retroactively lenient legislation goes further than
Article 7 ECHR, which ‘only’ stipulates a ban on retroactive criminal law.
Consequently, it could be argued that the principle of a more lenient provision
does not constitute a component of the ‘core legality rule’ and is therefore not
an absolute right, but instead an extended version of it. The reason for using it
stems from the purpose and function of criminal law; in other words, once
legislators change their opinion on what action should be made criminal, there
is no point in punishing ‘old’ wrongdoings. Therefore, Article 49(1) of the
Charter expressly mentions the possible use of favourable retroactive law.68
Accordingly, an important issue here is in what way, if at all, the principle of
legality in criminal law differs from the principle of legality in European law. It
is often argued in EU enforcement law doctrine that legal certainty (constituting
part of legality) is not meaningful as an abstract principle and that it should
instead be attributed on a case-by-case basis.69 The situation, however, is dif-
ferent in the context of criminal law, where legal certainty is presupposed as far
as possible, also at a more abstract level, and where the system in question needs
to be compliant with legality in its own right. Hence a case-by-case approach is
not sufficient in this area. Creating maximum certainty would require codifica-
tion of the criminal law provisions with regard to substantive criminal law.70
This may pose a challenge to the EU motto of united in diversity and moreover
is at odds with the adopted concept of mutual recognition, to the extent that it
also concerns substantive criminal law, within the AFSJ and instruments such as
the European Arrest Warrant that are directly based on trust and diversity.71
B. ‘Beyond reasonable doubt’: the meta-state level legislation
‘You have the right to remain silent’—Miranda72—is perhaps the most well-
known sentence any non-lawyer would think of if asked to mention a legal right,
and a frequent theme in American TV dramas. It is most definitely also on the
EU agenda, and several important instruments have recently been adopted in
this area, such as the Directive on the Right of Access to Lawyer.73
67 See also International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI) of 16
December 1966, Art 15.
68 See also Art. 15(1) Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and Art. 24 of the Rome (ICC) Statute.
69 S Prechal, Directives in EC Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 203.
70 These days, this is true also with regard to (most) criminal law in common law jurisdictions See,
for example, A Ashworth and J Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 7.
71 /584/JHA [2002] OJ L190/1, on the EAW framework decision.
72 US Supreme Court, Miranda v Arizona (1966), nr 759 June 13, 1966.
73 Directive 2013/48/EU, see also COM (2014) 144 final, ‘The EU Justice Agenda for 2020—
strengthening trust, mobility and growth within the Union’.
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As pointed out by Walen and Kumm, though, if the standard of achieving
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ as the basis for the presumption of innocence were to
tip totally in the direction of protecting individuals from being wrongly pun-
ished, there could be no institutionalized practice of punishment in a non-
utopian world.74 The presumption of innocence is still a holy principle in
criminal law theory, albeit not one that is immune from politics and failures
in the criminal process. Nevertheless, this presumption is the baseline of due
process guarantees and, as such, a core expression of the rule of law.75 After all,
Article 6(2)–(3) ECHR states inter alia that ‘Everyone charged with a criminal
offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law’ and
shall have the right ‘to examine or have examined any witnesses against him’.
There is no explicit general right to ‘expect’ a strictly laid down evidence pro-
cedure: what matters is that the evidence in question should be collected and
considered objectively.76 In other words, the crucial matter is that the defendant
must be treated fairly and have the right to a defence and that the burden of
proof rests—with certain limited exceptions—on the prosecutor.
The EU is currently very active in the field of procedural protection and fair
trial, which is a welcome development and a result of the extended competences
granted by the Lisbon Treaty. The first step in this process is Directive 2010/64
EU on the right to interpretation and translation,77 with a second, more recent
legislative initiative including the proposal for a Directive78 on the right to
information in criminal proceedings. The third step is the Directive on the
right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to commu-
nicate upon arrest.79 Arguably, the Directive on access to a lawyer is the most
far-reaching so far of any EU criminal law legislation in procedural criminal
law.80 In line with the mandate set out in the roadmap for the strengthening of
procedural rights, this Directive lays down minimum requirements at the EU
level governing the rights of suspected and accused persons and their right to
have access to a lawyer. It thus promotes the application of the Charter, and in
particular Articles 6, 47, and 48 of this Charter, by building on Article 6 ECHR
and the notion of a fair trial. Interestingly, the Directive states that ‘Any dero-
gation must be justified by compelling reasons pertaining to the urgent need to
avert danger for the life or physical integrity of one or more people, in addition,
74 M Kumm and AWalen, ‘Human dignity and proportionality: Deontic pluralism and balancing’,
in G. Huscroft et al. (eds), Proportionality and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014), 67.
75 See E van Sliedregt, Ten to One. A Contemporary Reflection on the Presumption of Innocence (The
Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2009).
76 It is also important that any uncertainties are interpreted in favour of the defendant.
77 Directive 2010/64EU, OJ L 280 of 26 October 2010.
78 Ibid.
79 Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to com-
municate upon arrest COM (2011) 326, adopted by JHA Council 2013.
80 See the discussion in House of Lords, 30th Report, The European Union’s policy on criminal
procedure. 30th report of session 2010–12.
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any derogation must comply with the principle of proportionality, which
implies that the competent authority must always choose the alternative that
least restricts the right of access to a lawyer and must limit the duration of the
restriction as much as possible. Furthermore, the proposed Directive states that
‘In accordance with ECHR case law, no derogation may be based exclusively on
the type or seriousness of the offence and any decision to derogate requires a
case-by-case assessment by the competent authority.’
The instruments are based on Article 82 (2) in order to facilitate mutual
recognition in criminal matters and facilitate a fair trial culture across Europe.
Furthermore, the Directive states that in accordance with ECHR case law, no
derogation may be based exclusively on the type or seriousness of the offence
and any decision to derogate requires a case-by-case assessment by the compe-
tent authority. It should be mentioned that the Charter of Fundamental Rights
also grants exceptions to the rule of absolute fundamental rights protection
(Article 52), contingent on the proportionality principle.
C. Proportionality as a value and the question of EU criminal law
enforcement
The principle of proportionality is of course sacred in the EU context.81 In
criminal law it is generally regarded as a principle for deciding on the level of the
punishment.82 In this sense, the sentencing judge has an obligation to provide
proper justification for the sentence imposed in a particular case.83 As Thorburn
puts it, ‘Her [the judge’s] first obligation is to determine what justice requires by
way of a proportionate sentence, for it is a matter of ‘common-sense notions of
justice, that how severely a person is punished should depend on the degree of
blameworthiness of his conduct’.84 As observed by Ashworth, though, while the
ECHR poses few constraints in this regard, other than the general message of
Article 7 ECHR and the ban on retroactive criminal law, Article 49 of the
Charter makes it clear that the severity of a penalty must not be disproportionate
to the criminal offence. Here, proportionality means that the punishment for an
offence should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence, taking into
account the harm, wrongdoing, and culpability involved. In addition, there is a
link between proportionality and the issue of a fair trial by insisting that the
appropriate legal safeguards must be respected.85 In other words,
81 Craig (n 14), 590.
82 A von Hirsch and A Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 131.
83 For a recent interesting study, N Lacy and H Pickard, ‘The chimera of proportionality:
Institutionalising limits on punishment in contemporary social and political systems’ (2015) 78
MLR 216–40.
84 Thorburn (n 17), 26.
85 A Ashworth, ‘Criminal law, human rights and preventive justice’ in A Norrie et al. (eds),
Regulating Deviance (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 87.
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proportionality can restrict the enforcement of sanctions if the latter are con-
sidered disproportionate.
Proportionality in criminal law could be a question, however, of self-defence; in
other words, the question of whether an act carried out in order to avoid a crime
being committed was proportionate to the harm caused.86 Moreover, the principle
of proportionality is generally seen as different from the traditional administrative
principle within EU law. The reason for this is that the administrative principle can
take future-oriented aspects and their broader impact on EU law into account, while
the principle of proportionality is restricted to the facts at hand. Consequently, the
administrative principle is prospective and thus different from the criminal law prin-
ciple of proportionality. The latter is retrospective and so requires the penalty to be
proportionate to the seriousness of the specific infringement. These issues obviously
demonstrate the very complex nature of supranational involvement in criminal law,
where the same principles can have different meanings. In other words, proportion-
ality constitutes an important value in EU criminal law by insisting on a common-
sense element in the law. At a more theoretical level, the very notion of propor-
tionality—the question of balance—is about ensuring fairness.87
The link between fairness and proportionality in an EU constitutional context
was demonstrated by the recent case of Digital Rights,88 where the Court of
Justice annulled the 2006 Data Retention Directive that was aimed at fighting
crime and terrorism and allowed data to be stored for up to two years. It
concluded that the measure breached proportionality on the grounds that the
Directive had a too sweeping generality and therefore violated, inter alia, the
basic right of data protection set out in Article 8 of the Charter. The Court
pointed out that the competent national authorities’ access to data retained was
not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an inde-
pendent administrative body whose decision sought to limit access to data to
what was strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective pursued.
Nor did it impose a specific obligation on Member States to establish such
limits. The EU legislator had therefore failed to provide sufficient justification.
The finding has a broader constitutional significance for the EU criminal law
project. If the Court is to develop criteria for the increasing use of proportion-
ality as a balancing principle in connection with the Charter, this will arguably
confirm a tentative version of a contextual criminal justice approach.
In addition, obviously, any enforcement of EU law needs to respect and safe-
guard the equality paradigm. As the Court of Justice has frequently pointed out,
the principle of non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not
be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same
86 See, eg, A von Hirsch and N Jareborg, ‘Gauging criminal harm: A living-standard analysis’
(1991) 11 OJLS 1.
87 See R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999).
88 Case C-293/12, opinion of AG Cruz Villon delivered on 12 December 2013, judgment of 8
April 2014.
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way unless such treatment is objectively justified.89 Hence, the notion of non-
discrimination is obviously of utmost importance in criminal law in that it forms
part of the broad concept of a fair trial. This brings us to the question of the
enforcement of procedural safeguards as part of the EU’s striving for equality.
IV. Reconciliation of the sanctions regime with due process
guarantees and mutual recognition
The discussion as set out above has served the purpose of outlining the debate
on sanctions at the meta-state level as well as highlighting the importance of
discussing the implications of fundamental principles of criminal law within this
debate. The purpose of doing so was to highlight the complex web of the
enforcement regime for sanctions and how the distinction between administra-
tive and criminal is blurred when entering the domain of criminal law theory.
Such a discussion seems particularly pertinent given that the EU has been
accused of neglecting procedural safeguards as part of the general securitization
of EU enforcement of criminal law following 9/11, and the hasty enactment of
instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).90
An important component for achieving a structured enforcement of values is,
of course, to have a sufficiently high standard of human rights across the EU.
The latest step in the direction of establishing a European framework of EU
criminal law for protecting the victim is the Directive on the protection of the
victim.91 This aims to ensure that the wide-ranging needs of victims of crime,
which cut across various other EU policies, are respected and met. The protec-
tion of victims’ rights is an essential element in a range of EU policies and
instruments related to human trafficking, sexual abuse, and sexual exploitation
of children, violence against women, terrorism, organized crime, and the en-
forcement of road traffic offences. The current weak status of the victim in EU
law is perhaps confirmed by the cases of Gueye and Sanchez and Criminal
proceedings against X concerning the interpretation of Framework Decision
2001/220/JHA on the protection of the victim.92 In these cases the Court of
Justice stated that not only did this Framework Decision leave a large margin of
appreciation to the Member States in their implementation, but also that the
89 See, for example, Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld ECR [2007] I-3633.
90 The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision [2002] OJ L 190/1, see eg M Fichera, The
Implementation of the European Arrest Warrant in the European Union Law, Policy and Practice
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2011). J Ouwerkerk, Quid Pro Quo? A Comparative Law Perspective on the
Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in Criminal Matters (Intersentia 2011).
91 Directive on establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of
crime, Directive 2012/29/EU.
92 Case C-483/09 and C-1/10 Gueye and Sanchez, judgment of 15 September 2011 (not yet
reported) and Case C-507/10 Criminal proceedings against X, judgment of 21 December 2011
(not yet reported).
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Framework Decision did not impose any obligation on Member States to ensure
that victims were treated in a manner equivalent to that of a party to proceed-
ings. Thus, the new Directive on the protection of the victim represents an
important symbolic gesture by the EU on the criminal justice stage and will
possibly enhance the successful enforcement of EU law. However, the EU is
currently also very active in the field of procedural protection in the legislative
domain.
As explained above, the enforcement of EU law through the template of
mutual recognition is based on trust.93 For this reason, the rather abstract
debate on sanctions and criminal law principles also needs to fit the empirical
reality of possible distrust in the Member States and conversely how the idea of
trust could be created.
This has long been the main theme in AFSJ law, particularly with regard to
EU cooperation in criminal law. Does mutual recognition, then, offer a plural-
istic approach to enforcements issues in criminal law? The answer to this ques-
tion would seem to be ‘No’, given the recent case of Da Silva Jorge, in which the
Court of Justice extended the reach of the classic effectiveness test to the EAW.94
In this case the Court emphasized the importance of the full effectiveness of the
operation of the EAW, also with regard to the possibility of opting out of this
measure in certain circumstances. For example, Article 3 EAW provides a list for
mandatory grounds for refusing to execute an EAW, such as where there are
granted amnesties, where there is a ne bis in idem (double jeopardy) situation, or
where, for example, the person in question is deemed too old to stand trial.
Article 4 EAW on the other hand lists a number of so-called optional grounds
for refusing to surrender and thereby reinstates the dual criminality concern by
giving some discretion to national authorities in this regard. Moreover, there are
possibilities for refusing to surrender a person where the crime in question is
statute barred or does not constitute a crime in the executing state or if the EAW
has been issued for the purposes of the execution of a custodial sentence or a
detention order and the person in question is resident in the executing state and
that state undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order in accordance
with its domestic law.
Yet in the Da Silva Jorge case, the Court held that despite the arrangements
laid down in the EAW, ‘the fact remains that the principle that national law
must be interpreted in conformity with European Union law, it also requires
national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole
body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative meth-
ods recognized by it, with a view to ensuring that the framework decision in
93 On mutual trust in the AFSJ see, K Lenearts, ‘The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice’, talk delivered at the Fourth Annual Sir Jeremy Lever lecture, All
Souls College, University of Oxford, 30 January 2015 (on file with the author).
94 Case C-42/11, Joao Pedro Lopes Da Silva Jorge, judgment of 5 September 2012 (not yet
reported).
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question is fully effective and to achieving an outcome consistent with the
objective pursued by it’. So effectiveness often appears to trump diversity in
criminal law matters if the idea of ‘trust’ is to be maintained.
Yet the well-known Advocaten voor de Wereld offers a good example of the
‘trust’ in trust as the solution for enforcement of criminal law in the Union.95 In
this case, the Court of Justice insisted that the EU judicial area for criminal law
cooperation had sufficient mutual trust in order to justify the application of
mutual recognition in this area. A lot of water has passed under the bridge since
then, however. In a recent communication on the strengthening of trust in the
Union, the EU Commission stated that people are increasingly crossing borders
and becoming increasingly frustrated by the cumbersome procedures.96
Interestingly, the Commission linked the issue of trust in criminal law to the
economic crisis and stated that cross-border movements had affected the effi-
ciency and capacity of some national justice systems and that this was under-
mining trust, while more trust was in fact needed. Moreover, the Court of
Justice held in Melloni that in a system such as that of EU criminal law cooper-
ation, which is based on mutual recognition, the very notion of trust means that
the individual EU Member States cannot use the Charter as a way of derogating
from the protection of EU fundamental rights.97 The Melloni case concerned
the validity of amendments made to the EAW by Framework Decision 2009/
299/JHA98 and addressed the application of the principle of mutual recognition
to trial in absentia. The Court of Justice held that a reading of the Charter as an
opt-out from trust would undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law.
Specifically, the Court stated that where an EU legal act calls for national im-
plementing measures, national authorities and courts remain free to apply na-
tional standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that these
national standards do not compromise either the level of protection provided
by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, or the primacy, unity, and effect-
iveness of EU law.99 It could be argued, however, that there is nothing to hinder
the EU from adopting a higher standard of protection than the Member States.
The message of Melloni then, according to the recent Opinion 2/13 on the
accession to the ECHR, is protecting EU law’s supremacy from divergent
(stricter) application of fundamental rights.100 In Opinion 2/13, the Court
held that the principle of mutual trust requires, particularly with regard to
95 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld [2007] ECR I-3633, case comment N de Boer CML
REv (2013).
96 COM (2014) 144 final, ‘The EU Justice Agenda for 2020—strengthening trust, mobility and
growth within the Union’.
97 Case C-399/11, Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni, judgment of 26 February 2013
(not yet reported).
98 Framework Decision, 2009/299/JHA, 2009 OJ L81/24.
99 Case C-399/11, Criminal proceedings against Stefano Melloni, judgment of 26 February 2013
(not yet reported), §60.
100 Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, EU accession to the ECHR.
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the AFSJ, ‘each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all
the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the
fundamental rights recognized by EU law’. Hence the EU’s accession to the
ECHR was seen as potentially weakening the EU enforcement project. This
unilateral approach may appear a contradictory message against the background
of the struggle to achieve better enforcement in criminal law.
Yet the creation of trust is a long-term challenge of fundamental importance
for the EU. Its communication entitled ‘The EU Justice Agenda for 2020—
Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the Union’ suggests, there-
fore, that there is reason for hope.101 The approach selected by the Commission
and summed up by three key words—consolidate, codify, and complement—
signifies that the Commission will focus on the need to uphold fundamental
rights by ensuring effective remedies and improving judicial training. With
regard to ‘consolidation’, the Commission has specifically emphasized the
need for digitization as this will facilitate access to justice. By ‘codification’,
the Commission means that the need to incorporate all legislation previously
enacted with regard to due process rights into a single instrument will make it
more accessible. Finally, and of utmost importance, by ‘complement’ the
Commission means that the EU should develop a common sense of justice
linked to the broader question of values. This would seem particularly import-
ant for the successful enforcement of EU values in criminal law.
If this paper has succeeded in its mission of outlining the complex sanction
regime in EU law and its complicated elements of criminal law, it begs funda-
mental questions as to the future of the AFSJ and how to reconcile high human
rights protection with EU enforcement concerns and more fundamentally what
it tells us about a criminal theory for Europe.
V. Concluding remarks
This paper had three specific aims. First, it started form the empirical position
that the enforcement of EU law against Member States is a question of the
willingness of the Member States to endorse the EU’s values. Yet, the question of
enforcing EU law against recalcitrant Member States appears slightly different in
the context of criminal law compared to that of more mainstream, or at least
more established, areas of EU law. Thus, the paper set out to explore the ques-
tion of enforcement through the sanctions regime, by illuminating how ‘messy’
the EU sanctions system is with regard to the division between administrative
(or regulatory) and criminal law sanctions. The paper did so by scanning recent
EU measures against financial criminality. The second part critiqued this
101 COM (2014) 144 final, ‘The EU Justice Agenda for 2020—strengthening trust, mobility and
growth within the Union’.
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through a normative framework by discussing the fundamentals of legality and
due process and highlighting the legal theoretical questions that are all too often
neglected in the EU criminal law debate. Subsequently, the third part looked at
enforcement issues through the lens of mutual recognition and procedural safe-
guards in EU criminal cases. The paper demonstrated that the enforcement web
for EU sanctions consists of a complicated and interrelated regime of adminis-
trative sanctions and criminal law sanctions interacting with the more general
theme of mutual recognition in EU criminal law and contingent on the effect-
iveness requirement of EU law.
Why then is such a study important? It is very important for several reasons.
Criminal law is different from other fields of law; insisting on the enforcement of
EU law may therefore have drastic consequences if less than the whole package of
procedural values in criminal law is applied. Criminal law is specifically different
because any enforcement of it would presuppose that the system offered by the EU
is of a higher quality, in terms of providing greater protection of the individual,
than the one offered by the nation state. So far, the EU criminal law venture has
developed on the basis of strong enforcement concerns and a desire to curtail
Member States’ sovereignty. It has also developed on the premises of a rather
fixed debate on the sanctions of EU law, with the administrative/constitutional
divide being largely static and not subject to any clear criteria, except for general
effectiveness concerns. This has been problematic from the perspective of creating a
culture of ‘fair’ enforcement in an EU criminal law project containing both the
sword (enforcement of norms) and the shield (protection of the individual).
Perhaps the conclusion of this paper is regrettable from the perspective of
national sovereignty, as it would arguably pre-suppose a full harmonization
programme (to ensure the rights set out in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights) of procedural criminal law at the EU level.
In any case EU criminal law offers a excellent, albeit difficult, test case of how
to promote trust in the Union project, and thereby facilitate the operation of
mutual recognition, as a way of fostering a good culture in AFSJ law through
enforcement. Yet recent case law on mutual recognition and the operation of the
EAW seems to be focused more on maintaining the effectiveness of the EU
enforcement machinery. This may render the enforcement of EU law against
unwilling Member States a tough job—at least in the current shaky political
climate—and the EU will have to make sure that the incentives offered are
worth the possible losses in individual states.
As the present author has suggested elsewhere, despite the broader mandate
given by the Lisbon Treaty, it would be wise for the EU legislator (in the current
state of play) to limit itself to ‘cross-border’ criminality and the field of financial
crimes that in one way or another could be linked to the concept of market
creation.102 The reason for this is that the EU has already been relying on quasi-
102 Herlin-Karnell (n 3) ch 8.
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penal law in terms of administrative sanctions in this area for a long time, so the
difference would not be very great. The danger is when the legislator adopts a
double system of sanctions and the proportionality principle must be considered
when deciding on the need for double regimes of sanctions. Therefore Article 49
of the Charter, stipulating the ‘right’ to a proportionate sanction should apply to
all sanctions and could work as a rebutter of double punishment.103
Last but not least, we should not forget that the use of enforcement through
criminal law at the meta-state level involves the use of coercive power against the
individual; this ultimately begs the question of what it means to create a good
European culture of EU criminal law in the current times of enforcement con-
cerns and what kind of sanctions regime the EU is striving to establish.
103 A Barak, Proportionality, Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012). See also Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson judgment of 26 February 2013
(not yet reported).
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